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 Exploring childhood, criminal responsibility and the evolving 
capacities of the child: the age of criminal responsibility in England 
and Wales 
 
 
Raymond Arthur 
 
Abstract 
 
Currently in England and Wales the law considers that all children below 10 years of age are 
exempt from criminal liability for their actions as such children are morally not responsible 
and lacking blameworthiness. This approach to young people in conflict with the law 
misrepresents the evidence regarding young people who offend and encourages highly 
contestable judgments about individuality, identity and welfare. I will argue that children 
have a right to respect for their evolving capacities and that respecting this right would help 
to re-direct the criminal justice system towards a normative framework better equipped to 
accommodate the realities of childhood and in which the child’s experience of vulnerability 
and powerlessness is embedded throughout. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In England and Wales the age of criminal responsibility is set at 10 years. The current law 
therefore assumes all children are sufficiently mature at the age of 10 to accept criminal 
responsibility for their behaviour. This means that normative criteria, such as the physiological 
and psychological development of the individual child, are not being used to identify the divide 
between childhood and adulthood. Instead the low age of criminal responsibility misrepresents 
the evidence we have regarding young people who offend and their evolving capacities. 
Children are still in the process of maturing at this stage of life and may not yet be developed 
enough to understand the wrongfulness of what they do. Children and young people are less 
mature than adults in terms of their judgement and sensation-seeking and experience 
difficulties in weighing and comparing consequences when making decisions and 
contemplating the meaning of long-range consequences. These cognitive difficulties also have 
implications for a young person’s ability to be a competent defendant in an adversarial 
atmosphere. Young defendants who may not understand the consequence of their offending, 
including those with impaired mental capacity, are exposed to the full rigours of the criminal 
justice system unless their decision-making capacities are impaired, for example by a mental 
illness which is attributable to a condition falling within the M’Nagthen rules, or they are 
substantially intellectually impaired. 
This approach to young people in conflict with the law effectively constructs such 
children as non-children who do not deserve to remain children. Consequently the rights of the 
offender as a child, in particular marginalised and socially excluded children, become invisible 
and ignored. This article will argue that children have a right to respect for their evolving 
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 capacities and that respecting this right would re-direct the criminal justice system towards a 
normative framework better equipped to accommodate the realities of childhood; one which 
contains a clear foregrounding of the child’s experiences and the reality of their daily lives and 
in which the child’s experience of vulnerability and powerlessness is embedded throughout. If 
such a focus on children’s rights were applied to young people in conflict with the law it would 
ensure that young people who are not sufficiently mature and competent to understand the 
process of a trial in a criminal court, including the youth court, could not be held criminally 
culpable for their behaviour. Criminal liability could only be imposed upon children who had 
sufficient mental capacity, competence and maturity to understand the nature of their conduct 
and exercise volition over their behaviour. 
 
Childhood 
Ferguson has argued that any debate over the value of children’s rights both begins and ends 
with the social construction of childhood.1 Childhood is a contested terrain which suggests the 
physical growth of the child to full maturity, mirrored by intellectual, psychological, social and 
moral development.2 Aries noted that ‘in medieval society the idea of childhood did not exist’ 
and that various languages did not even have words to describe childhood.3 Aries argued that 
it was not until the mid-18th century that the modern concept of childhood emerged with the 
child occupying a central place in the family. For the Romantics the concept of childhood 
became synonymous with a concept of ‘original innocence’ derived from Rousseau. Rousseau, 
in Social Contract of 1762, considered that childhood was a period of innocence and 
mutability.4 In particular he stressed the natural goodness of children and evoked sentiments 
that children were deserving of protection and education rather than punishment. For Rousseau 
the innocent child is recognisable through encouragement, assistance, support and facilitation. 
Similarly Locke, in Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693)5 and An Essay on Human 
Understanding (1700),6 believed that whatever children are, they are not partially formed 
adults as there are incontrovertible cognitive and developmental differences between adults 
and children. Locke believed that children did not possess inbuilt categories of understanding 
or a general facility to reason. Locke assumed that through natural development the child’s 
dependency, incompetence and irrationality give way to adult independence, competency, the 
ability to reason and to act responsibly.7 These views sowed the seeds of the belief that children 
are everybody’s concern and that they constitute an investment in the future in terms of the 
reproduction of social order.  
 From the middle of the 19th century the concept of childhood developed together with 
ideas of responsibility for children’s moral and social development. Out of this developed 
notions of parental responsibility and the general collective interest of the state for the 
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 wellbeing of children as a future generation.8 Such realities were bolstered by law. Compulsory 
education began to develop during the 1870s and cruelty to children became a criminal offence 
with the passing of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1899. The 1899 Act aimed to 
deter the mistreatment of children and made it an offence for a person over the age of 16 years 
to ‘assault, ill-treat, neglect or abandon any child for whom he has responsibility’. These 
modern constructions of childhood dictate empowering children through seeing them as 
deserving of some respect and privileging of children’s special interests through 
acknowledging the aspirations of rights for children.  
 Arneil argues that children’s rights theorists have very good reason for advocating 
rights for children. If you want to take children’s needs and interests seriously, and make claims 
on their behalf that will compete with any other moral claims, it is necessary to make such 
claims in the language of rights. It is clear that any non-rights moral claim simply does not 
carry the same weight in contemporary moral or political debate.9 Similarly, Archard reasons 
that ‘[p]erhaps it is a fundamental mistake legally to give children that to which they are not 
morally entitled’; nevertheless, giving children legal rights will make a huge difference to how 
we think about them.10 For Ferguson, rights talk is beneficial because it empowers children in 
the sense of ensuring their equal respect and it enfranchises them by enabling their unique 
narratives and perspectives to be shared. However Brighouse warns that children’s rights talk 
could ‘systematically mislead people into neglecting the facts of children’s vulnerability, 
dependence, and inabilities’.11 Similarly O’Neill argues that that children’s fundamental rights 
are best grounded by embedding them in a wider account of fundamental obligations, which 
can also be used to justify positive rights and obligations.12. O’Neill examined the legal and 
moral principles behind children’s rights. She argued that children should be protected and 
nurtured because of their special vulnerabilities and thus should not have full rights. Huntington 
supports this view, arguing that children do not have full autonomy, and therefore rights as a 
mechanism for promotion of their welfare or access to citizenship are ineffective and 
inappropriate.13 Huntington argues that a rights-based model of child welfare does not protect 
the interests of children as it privileges autonomy over assistance and obscures the important 
role of poverty in the lives of children suffering disadvantage; it perpetuates an adversarial 
approach to decision-making and consequently fosters conflict, rather than collaboration, 
between the state and families. Huntington therefore recommends ‘shifting rights to the 
background’14 echoing O’Neill’s view that a child’s ‘main remedy is to grow up’.15 However 
this proposed remedy is of little use to young people involved in the criminal justice system. 
There is considerable evidence to confirm that the criminalisation of children is associated with 
higher levels of offending in adulthood. Significantly, this effect has been demonstrated across 
different jurisdictions, including those that adopt more or less punitive approaches to youth 
                                                 
8
 Michael Wyness Childhood and Society (Palgrave, 2006); Robert Dingwall, John Eekelaar and Topsy Murray 
The protection of children: state intervention and family life 2nd ed. (Blackwell, 1995), 220. 
9
 Barbara Arneil, ‘Becoming versus being: A critical analysis of the child in liberal theory’. In David Archard 
and Colin M. Macleod The Moral and Political Status of Children  (Oxford University Press, 2002), 86. 
10
 David Archard Children: Rights and Childhood, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2004), 57. 
11
 Harry Brighouse ‘What rights (if any) do children have?’. In  David Archard and  Colin M. Macleod The 
Moral and Political Status of Children (Oxford University Press, 2002), 35. 
12
 Onora O’Neill ‘Children’s rights and children’s lives’, (1988) 98 Ethics 445; Also, Onora O’Neill ‘Children’s 
rights and children’s lives’ (1992) 6 International Journal of Law and the Family 24. 
13
 Claire Huntington ‘Rights myopia in child welfare’ (2006) 53 UCLA Law Review 637. 
14
 Ibid, 642. 
15
 Onora O’Neill ‘Children’s rights and children’s lives’, (1988) 98 Ethics 445. 
 offending.16 Contact with the youth justice system reduces the likelihood that children will 
complete school and obtain educational qualifications, and consequently impacts directly on 
the chances of future employment.17 
 In this article I will argue that in the context of the youth justice system in general, and 
the age of criminal responsibility in particular, emphasising an approach which recognises that 
the child has rights helps to ensure a clear foregrounding of the child’s experiences and an 
invitation to empathise with the child’s feelings. Acknowledging the child’s right to respect for 
their evolving holds significant potential to address many of the profound theoretical and 
practical shortcomings of the youth justice system.18 The expressive values of rights should not 
be discounted as mere semantics, rights matter to children because the language of children’s 
rights may be regarded as a vital tool in defending the intrinsic importance of children and 
articulating what it is about children that gives them such value.19 Choudhry and Fenwick 
contend that thinking in terms of rights makes it more likely that we consider all the relevant 
interests at stake because of the explicit articulation such an analysis requires.20 Considering 
the issue in broader terms, Freeman reasons that: ‘[t]he language of rights can make visible 
what has for too long been suppressed. It can lead to different and new stories being heard in 
public’.21 The suggestion is that, even if outcomes remained unchanged, it would be better for 
children to be seen through the lens of rights.22 As Ferguson notes:  
 
The statement that a child has a particular right is both an expression of an existing social norm that 
recognises the importance of the content of that legal right to the child, as well as a means of changing 
social norms to be more reflective of that importance.23  
 
 
The relevance and applicaion of a child’s rights-based approach in the context of children’s 
criminal capacity cannot be underestimated as this approach acknowledges children’s inherent 
vulnerability and immaturity and their lack of capacity and agency to make decisions in their 
own best interests. Woodhouse has characterised such an approach as an environmentalist 
model that focusses on the ecology of the child rather than the child as an isolated individual.24 
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 Such an environmentalist/rights’ approach would better serve the twin goals of the youth 
justice system to prevent offending by children and young people25 and to have regard to the 
welfare of the child.26 This focus on children as rights holders would avoid conflict between 
the competing rights of young people, parents, victims and the state and instead create a rhetoric 
which focusses more on adult responsibility and children’s needs  and the broader issues 
affecting the young person.  
 
Children’s rights approach to the ‘age of criminal responsibility’ 
 
Babic is critical of any approach which offers a ‘fairly undifferentiated understanding of 
children and childhood’ and which fails to recognise that a child does not simply 'turn into an 
adult all of a sudden but needs to go through processes of development and growth till they 
reach adulthood’.27 Children of 10 years are not adults and the more a young person is involved 
with crime, the greater the gap with adults tends to be. Yet once they are 10 years of age they 
can be subject to an adversarial system, modelled closely on a criminal justice system designed 
for convicting and punishing adults, a system that prioritises the finding of guilt or innocence 
and sentencing for a particular offence. The low age of criminal responsibility in England and 
Wales reflects a simplistic functionalist perspective which focuses its attention on a policy of 
containment through the morality of blaming young people’s behaviour as a product of 
personal pathology. This construction of childhood is wedded to a punitive model which 
focusses on the offence alone at the expense of considering the connections between the child 
and their wider social situation. This approach ignores the socio-economic and cultural 
contexts of young people’s lives and fails to respect the child’s present and future rational 
autonomy and capacity. It ignores the evidence that the child’s inexperience and under-
developed powers of self-control and reasoning make them prone to acting in ways they cannot 
help, understand or intend. Instead children who are involved in offending behaviour are 
reconstructed as non-children and consequently are denied the right to respect for their 
evolving capacities. The child offender is considered an agentive child who must accept 
responsibility. Although the youth courts are required to have regard to the welfare of the 
child,28 welfare issues are not a primary or paramount consideration of the court.29  
 
This simplistic, desensitising and pejorative portrayal of young people in trouble plays on 
popular fears about young offenders and provides a ‘discursive benchmark’30 which underpins 
and dominates the development of youth justice law and policy in a way which is 
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 unsympathetic to a discourse of rights, egalitarianism, inclusion and justice. What the current 
system of youth justice does insufficiently is to locate the behavioural repertoires of young 
people within a holistic socio-economic context. Arguably this void constitutes a significant 
political, organisational, and moral failure that could be rectified by emphasising the 
importance of acknowledging children’s evolving capacities in the maintenance of their rights. 
Such an approach would re-direct the criminal justice system towards a normative framework 
better equipped to accommodate the realities of childhood. This framework would contain a 
clear foregrounding of the child’s experiences and the reality of daily life and one in which the 
child’s experience of vulnerability and powerlessness is embedded throughout. An approach 
based upon respect for children’s rights is one which clearly resonates with Dixon and 
Nussbaum’s capabilities (or human development) approach.31 
 
Evolving capacities 
 
Dixon and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is an emerging theory based on the idea of human 
dignity. According to Dixon and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, children come into the 
world with a variety of undeveloped capacities and there is a consequent moral need to protect 
them while these capacities develop.32 The capabilities approach aims at supporting the growth 
of agency and practical reasoning by urging a duty upon the state to help realise the capacity 
of each individual to think and reason in an informed and independent way. As such, children 
should be afforded the maximum scope for decisional freedom consistent with their actual 
capacity for rational and reasoned forms of choice or judgment.33 Dixon and Nussbaum argue 
that children have a right to assistance in reaching their capabilities, otherwise they will be 
‘mutilated and deformed’ by their experiences. This right to assistance and protection is 
recognised in other parts of the English legal system. For instance a young person must be 16-
years-old before they can consent to sexual relations, including consensual sexual relations 
with another young person. A young person cannot join the armed forces until they are 16-
years-old. They must be 18-years-old to buy cigarettes or alcohol, get a tattoo or vote. There 
are exceptions to the rules of contract which apply to young people.34 Within family law, young 
people are assumed to lack the competency to participate responsibly and articulate their own 
wishes and feelings unless they can prove to the court that they have sufficient understanding.35 
Thus the law recognises that these actions require a certain level of maturity and capacity and 
that children need protection in a paternalistic form from the long-term consequences of their 
immaturity in various areas of their lives.   
Dixon and Nussbaum argue that it is because of their human frailty, particularly so with 
children, that the ‘state has an obligation to ensure that all persons have access to a life worthy 
of human dignity’.36 A particularly salient feature of the capabilities approach in the context of 
youth criminal liability is that it provides a normative framework for the evaluation of the 
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 development and well-being of individual persons as well as for the assessment of the quality 
of social arrangements.37 Clark and Eisenhuth suggest that the ‘same metric of human dignity 
applied to adults should also be addressed to children, even though it might need to be specified 
in a certain age-dependent way’.38 The capabilities approach implicitly advocates egalitarian, 
political conceptions of social justice which are concerned with the cultivation, maximisation 
and just distribution of the (real) freedom of individuals.39 The attention to what rights, goods, 
institutions or services do to human beings implies the necessity to focus on real tangible, 
dependent and vulnerable human beings with their own biographies, specific needs and socially 
and culturally embedded ways of conducting their lives. Therefore the capabilities perspective 
commands a high degree of context sensitivity.40 From the capabilities perspective it is the task 
of public institutions to ensure that individuals can in reasonable and tolerable conditions 
decide on their own in favour of the realisation of these capabilities.41 Beyond looking at the 
actual choices made by children it is much more interesting to consider the fact that they may 
not have freedom to choose alternative ways of being and acting.42 Children and young people 
are still developing in terms of their cognitive capacity and emotional maturity and are often 
much more impulsive than adults. Children involved in crime, particularly persistently, are 
often the least ready to assume the responsibilities associated with autonomous individuality, 
to participate effectively in their own criminal proceedings, and the most seriously in need of 
adult help and guidance. 
         Other theorists have also developed paternalistic approaches which, similar to Dixon and 
Nussbaum, acknowledge the right of the child to recognition and protection of their 
vulnerability. In Feinberg’s view, children cannot be adjudged as autonomous agents. 43 
Autonomy connotes the capacity for ‘ethical evaluation and self-control’44  as well as the 
competency for self-rule or self-government, which is based on personal rationale, 
deliberations, choices, and motivations, and, more importantly, freedom from external 
manipulations, distortions, and coercions. 45  Feinberg contends that children possess 
‘anticipatory autonomy rights’ that draw their importance from the adult the child will become. 
Feinberg designated these rights as the child’s right to ‘an open future’ because they exist to 
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 facilitate the child’s development of autonomy.46 Feinberg’s ‘Open Future’ principle has been 
widely invoked in applied ethical discourses such as genetic reproductive technologies,47 
however its relevance for application in the context of children involved in the criminal justice 
system cannot be underestimated as it acknowledges children’s inherent vulnerability and 
immaturity and their lack of capacity and agency to make decisions in their own best interests. 
The right to an open future is a right to have future options available until the child is ‘a fully 
formed self-determining adult’ capable of making their own choices.48 This right protects the 
child against having important life choices determined by others before she has the ability to 
make them for herself so as to preserve the child’s future options. It therefore includes 
restrictions on what others are allowed to do to children as it is imperative that the child’s future 
options are not prematurely closed.49  
 
         Hollingsworth has suggested that a system of criminal justice will be illegitimate if it 
permanently restricts the child’s ability to develop the capacities necessary for future global 
autonomy.50 To ensure that children can develop into fully autonomous right-holders when 
they achieve majority, the state must give special status to a particular category of childhood 
rights, which Hollingsworth characterises as ‘foundational rights’, which support the child in 
becoming autonomous at the point of achieving majority. This ‘foundational rights’ approach 
requires that children are treated according to principles of equality, due process and justice, 
but any punishment cannot permanently restrict the child’s ability to develop the capacities 
necessary for future global autonomy. Specifically in this context it requires the age of criminal 
responsibility to be set above the age at which punishment would cause irreparable harm to the 
child’s foundational rights. 
       Tobin’s rights-based construction of childhood develops Feinberg’s ‘Open Future’ 
principles and Hollingsworth’s ‘foundational rights’ approach further by arguing that the best 
interests of the child are, as a minimum, a primary consideration in all matters concerning 
them. 51  Tobin argues that a rights-based approach provides conceptual clarity when 
determining the meaning and content of the child’s best interests. The indeterminacy of this 
child’s best interests has often allowed it to be used as a proxy for the interests of others.52 
Ultimately Tobin posits that a rights-based approach demands that a child’s best interests be 
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 informed by a consideration of all of the other rights of the child.53 Tobin recommends that 
courts adopt an evidence-based approach when determining the best interests of the child by 
using empirical evidence in relation to the specific child, or children more generally. The law’s 
assumptions about children’s criminal capacity are unsupported by the bulk of empirical 
research concerning the mental capabilities of preadolescents. Developments in neuroimaging 
technology have allowed for a more detailed understanding of the adolescent brain which has 
found that there are developmental differences in the brain’s biochemistry and anatomy that 
may limit adolescents’ ability to perceive risks, control impulses, understand consequences and 
control emotions.54 The prefrontal lobe is ‘involved in behavioural facets germane to many 
aspects of criminal culpability’ including ‘the control of aggression and other impulses’55 and 
yet this lobe is the last area to mature.56 This research has examined the brain development and 
cognitive functioning of adolescents and has found that with respect to moral culpability, those 
parts of the brain that deal with judgement, impulsive behaviour and foresight develop in the 
twenties rather than the teen years.57 Because the prefrontal lobe is not fully mature and is still 
developing during adolescence, teens are almost inevitably overly emotional, more prone to 
risk taking and subject to wide mood swings, immature judgement, decreased risk perception 
and impaired future-time perspective.58 Furthermore their functioning in respect of considering 
issues empathically from the perspective of others, capacity for autonomy and resisting 
pressure from others and their ability to experience guilt and shame are underdeveloped.59 This 
contributes to the tendency to make choices that are harmful to themselves and others.  
             Additionally the way in which psycho-social factors influence decision making and the 
kinds of choices adolescents make, depend in part on the social and family context in which 
young people find themselves. Children involved in crime, particularly where that involvement 
is persistent, have often had difficult, deprived backgrounds and serious multiple problems in 
terms of their school achievement, psychological health, alcohol and drug abuse and family 
life.60 The challenges that confront children who are engaging in anti-social and offending 
behaviour, their families and the various professionals who work with them are complex, deep-
rooted and multi-faceted. These children are the most disadvantaged, have the poorest 
educational experiences and are more likely to suffer from poor health, including mental health 
and substance misuse.  
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               These developmental differences render such children and young people the least 
ready to assume the responsibilities associated with autonomous individuality and to 
participate effectively in their own criminal proceedings, and the most seriously in need of 
adult help and guidance. Evidence suggests that young defendants often do not understand 
legal proceedings or the language used by lawyers, they report feeling intimidated and isolated 
in court and may not receive a proper explanation of what has happened until after a hearing is 
over.61 Children lack the ability to concentrate for long periods and it may be difficult for them 
to participate properly in proceedings. The child may not be able to follow evidence and may 
not understand the complex language used in court. As a result he may not be able to give 
instructions to his lawyer and may not be in a position to make vital decisions.62 Young 
offenders also feel frustration that the courts seem rarely to understand the context in which 
their offences were committed, including the pressures facing them. 
         Schapiro characterises childhood as a ‘non-ideal status of normative immaturity.’ 
Schapiro suggests that the progression from childhood to adulthood is a progression from 
heteronomy to self-hegemony.63 According to Schapiro, ‘… autonomy starts out as sovereignty 
over limited domains of discretion.’ The development of children’s autonomy will be aided by 
allowing them to develop their self-hegemony in a piecemeal fashion, such that they gradually 
achieve self-determination over the various ‘domains of their lives.64 For Schapiro this imposes 
an obligation on the part of parents and the state to strive to reduce their child’s predicament 
of subjection to the will of others, so as to enable them to ‘awaken to a sense of their own 
freedom and responsibility’ and become ‘free to control themselves.’65 It is in this way that 
children become able to govern themselves as free wills.66 For Schapiro, recognition that 
children occupy a ‘non-ideal status of normative immaturity’ imposes obligations on parents 
and society to do what is in our power as adults to help children work their way out of 
childhood. Our negative obligation as adults must be to refrain from hindering them in this 
effort.67 
 
United Nations law and European law  
The current law on the age of criminal responsibility takes no account of the child’s 
inexperience and evolving capacities and powers of self-control and reasoning, which make 
them prone to acting in ways they cannot help, understand or intend. In international human 
rights law, the child’s ‘anticipatory autonomy rights’ are explicitly linked to the concept of the 
child’s evolving capacities in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child which 
represents the most comprehensive legally binding statement of children’s rights. The UN 
Convention embraces the concept of autonomy where it is inextricably linked to the concept 
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 of the child’s evolving capacities, 68  the principle of the child’s active and informed 
participation in all matters affecting her or him69  and the understanding that children are 
independent holders of rights.70 The evolving capacities principle of the Convention is codified 
in Article 5 which states that ‘States parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties 
of parents or, where applicable the members of the extended family or community as provided 
for by local custom … to provide in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the 
child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized 
in the present Convention’. The notion of the child’s evolving capacities is also reflected in 
Article 12.1 which reads as follows: ‘States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of 
forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the 
child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity 
of the child’. Furthermore the preamble of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child refers 
to the notion of dignity; ‘Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the 
Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world’.71 This echoes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that 
‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’.72 The evolving capacities 
principle can thus be understood as a stimulant for the recognition of the special capacities of 
children and their promotion, taking into account that children are in a process of development, 
but not necessarily ranking these capacities in a hierarchical sense. 
              The UN Convention promotes the view that children are no longer merely ‘potential 
adults’ but are cast as full human beings invested with important social citizenship rights,73 
including the right to have their best interests seen as a primary consideration in all court 
actions involving them (Article 3). The primary importance of Article 3 is in making children’s 
interests visible and giving them force in decision-making processes.74 The Convention not 
only constructs children as rights-bearing citizens with a range of social, political and civil 
rights, but also calls upon states to ensure that they are active, participating citizens, playing a 
role in governance ‘according to their age and maturity’, rather than simply ‘being passively 
governed’.75 The UN Convention recognises that young people under the age of 18 years may 
need special protection because of their age or emotional development. Consequently, in the 
context of the age of criminal responsibility, Article 40 of the UN Convention requires each 
state to set a reasonable minimum age of criminal responsibility. The United Nations Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules) 1985 
recommend that this minimum age shall not be fixed at too low an age level, bearing in mind 
the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity. The important consideration, as 
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 outlined in Rule 17 of the Beijing Rules, is whether a child, by virtue of his or her individual 
discernment and understanding, can be held responsible for their behaviour. The Commentary 
to the Beijing Rules stresses that there should be a close relationship between the age of 
criminal responsibility and the age at which young people acquire other social rights such as 
marital status and the right to vote. In line with this rule the UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child has recommended the age of 12 years as the absolute minimum age of criminal 
responsibility.76 
          In R v G77 Lord Steyn believed that the United Nations Convention created a norm which 
acknowledged that the criminal justice system should take account of a defendant’s age, level 
of maturity, and intellectual and emotional capacity. Lord Steyn emphasised that ignoring the 
special position of children in the criminal justice system is not acceptable in a modern civil 
society. In the same case, Lord Bingham held that it was neither moral nor just to convict a 
young person on the strength of what someone else would have apprehended if the defendant 
himself had no such apprehension. As Lord Diplock stated, in the differing context of the 
former partial defence of provocation to murder, ‘to require old heads on young shoulders is 
inconsistent with the law’s compassion of human infirmity’.78 More recently the Court of 
Appeal stated in R v L, in the context of young defendants trafficked into the UK who had been 
convicted of various offences including the production and supply of cannabis and use of a 
forged passport, that age is always a relevant factor in the case of a child defendant which may 
significantly diminish, and in some cases effectively extinguish, their culpability.79  
             The EU Commission’s 2006 Communication Towards an EU Strategy on the Rights 
of the Child adopts the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as the established benchmark 
for children’s rights at EU level.80 The 2011 EU Agenda for the Rights of the Child reinforces 
the full commitment of the EU to promote, protect and fulfil the rights of the child in all relevant 
EU policies and actions. The 2011 Agenda includes 11 concrete actions where the EU can 
contribute in an effective way to children’s well-being and safety; these actions include the 
development of a ‘child-friendly’ justice system. The European Committee of Social Rights 
has also declared that the age of criminal responsibility in England is ‘manifestly too low’ and 
accordingly is not in conformity with Article 17 of the European Social Charter which provides 
mothers and children with a right to social and economic protection.81 The European Social 
Charter, a Council of Europe treaty signed in 1961, guarantees social and economic human 
rights. The Council of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner has also frequently expressed 
concern at the low age of criminal responsibility in England. The Commissioner in 2005, 
Alvarez Gil-Robles, commented that he had ‘extreme difficulty in accepting that a child of 12 
or 13 can be criminally culpable for his actions, in the same sense as an adult’.82 While noting 
that the European Convention on Human Rights does not require any age limit to be set before 
a child can be held criminally responsible, the Commissioner suggested that the age level in 
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 England should be raised to bring it into line with other European countries. In 2009 the 
Commissioner Thomas Hammarberg argued for an increase in the age of criminal 
responsibility across Europe with the aim of progressively reaching 18 years and recommended 
that innovative systems of responding to juvenile offenders below that age should be tried with 
a genuine focus on their education, reintegration and rehabilitation.83 In V and T v UK84 the 
European Court of Human Rights recognised the variation in minimum ages across Europe 
and, though stating that the age of 10 years in England is at the lower end of the spectrum, held 
that ‘it cannot be said to be so young as to differ disproportionately from the age limit followed 
in other European States’. 85  Nevertheless the principle of acknowledging the evolving 
capacities of young people was recognised by the European Court of Human Rights in V and 
T v UK. In this case Lord Reed held that ‘Even children who may appear to be lacking in 
innocence or vulnerability are nevertheless evolving, psychologically as well as physically, 
towards the maturity of adulthood’.86 This case involved Jon Venables and Robert Thompson, 
two boys convicted of murdering toddler James Bulger in 1993. The European Court of Human 
Rights were particularly struck by the paradox that children who were deemed to have 
sufficient mental capacity to engage their criminal responsibility had a play-area made 
available to them during adjournments. Indeed five dissenting judges expressed the view that 
fixing 10 as the age of criminal responsibility was almost certainly in breach of Article 3 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights.  
Conclusion 
 
What is evident is that the youth justice system in England and Wales uses an adult template 
to measure young people’s criminal responsibility and overlooks young people’s particular 
vulnerabilities. Acknowledging that the child has a right to respect for their evolving capacities 
does not seek to impose controls on children but to provide boundaries which are not fixed and 
are typically renegotiated by children.87 Applying such a children’s rights approach to young 
people in conflict with the law would ensure that young people who are not sufficiently mature 
and competent to understand the process of a trial in a criminal court, including the youth court, 
could not be held criminally culpable for their behaviour. Criminal liability could only be 
imposed after an assessment of the mental capacity, competence and maturity of each child. 
Such an assessment would need to acknowledge the limitations of criminal justice as a means 
of preventing and dealing with crime and antisocial behaviour and instead consider whether 
the child’s needs would best be met by non-criminal methods of social intervention.  
             The method being advocated here is not without criticism as it may lead to unclear and 
unpredictable outcomes. Emphasising such an individualised focus on the child’s needs may 
plausibly result in uncertain and unclear outcomes and disproportionate and indeterminate 
treatments, in circumstances where if an adult had committed the offences they would have 
been treated more leniently. Certainty has traditionally been seen as an important and defining 
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 characteristic of the rule of law.88 For example Hayek stressed that the rule of law should 
involve rules rather than standards, determinate rather than open-ended language and closure 
rather than continued deliberation.89 What is being proposed here undermines the certainty that 
is emphasised as part of the rule of law ideal. However Eekelaar asks whether it should always 
be an object of legal processes to provide clear and predictable outcomes?90 Instead he argued 
that the law provides points of departure and frameworks within which reasoned decisions are 
taken, but ‘thoughtful discretion’ is also included rather than the law operating in a mechanical 
and thoughtless way in the pursuit of an exalted ideal of predictability. Waldron has described 
the processes by which such decisions are taken within legal systems as ‘forms of 
argumentative thoughtfulness’91 which he considers to be a key feature of the rule of law. 
      This altruistic paternalism is justified as the temporal position of childhood and adolescence 
in the ordinary lifespan justifies holding children to different standards when determining their 
ability to make choices.92 This is not to imply that the harms caused by youth offending should 
be tolerated, but means ensuring that all children who are alleged to have offended have access 
to the range of health and social care services they require whether they are formally prosecuted 
or not. This view of young people recognises that the child offender lacks capacity and 
consequently there is a need for both the family and the state to take responsibility for 
children’s needs and to respond to youth offending by providing young people with the 
necessary tools to grow into civilised and competent adults. This is underpinned by the pursuit 
of social justice and a prevailing assumption that the role of the state is to try to realise a more 
just, equitable and inclusive society. 
             The low age of criminal responsibility underestimates the relevance of age and the full 
trajectory of development from childhood through adolescence and to adulthood. It ensures 
that the power imbalance between children and adults is sustained, the special status of 
childhood is diminished and the child’s human rights are violated. The low age of criminal 
responsibility marginalises the important developmental differences between children and 
adults and allows the criminal justice system to treat young offenders as entirely rational, fully 
responsible young adults rather than children, thus justifying their subjection to the full rigours 
of the criminal law. As Lord Dholakia stated when introducing the Age of Criminal 
Responsibility Bill in the House of Lords '…children who are too young to attend secondary 
school can be prosecuted and receive a criminal record…'93  Raising the age of criminal 
responsibility would bring conceptual attention to the nature of the child’s evolving capacities 
and would stimulate an integrated analysis of how to respond to youthful antisocial and 
offending behaviour by considering how multiple stakeholders such as families, schools, social 
workers and government can affect children’s well-being. Such an approach opens the way for 
evaluating the effect of criminal justice responses on particular children and for creative 
solutions to be developed. As Lord Dholakia stated: 
 
It cannot be right to deal with such young children in a criminal process based on ideas of culpability 
which assume a capacity for mature, adult-like decision-making. There is no other area of law – whether 
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 it is the age for buying a pet, the age for paid employment, the age of consent to sexual activity or the 
age for smoking and drinking – where we regard children as fully competent to take informed decisions 
until later in adolescence. The age of criminal responsibility is an anomalous exception.94  
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